$yringegate
Cashing in
on the HIV pandemic
First edition published
on napnt.org on Monday 16th
August 2004
Story and research: Gary Meyerhoff. Edits: Rob Inder-Smith.
Further research:
Scott White.
Introduction
“Retractable Syringes represent
one of the most serious threats to our health and human rights we have
seen in
years.”
Annie Madden, Executive
Officer, Australian Injecting and Illicit Drug Users League(1)
When
Australian Prime Minister John Howard promised a $30
million trial of retractable syringes in November 2001 the harm
reduction
sector saw it as another attack on the human rights of people who use
illicit drugs.
Three years later, the trial has commenced and we are still framing our
response on the basis that the trial is part of John Howard’s war on
drugs.
Little
did we that know that the trial of retractable
syringes in our needle/syringe programs (NSPs) is really a smokescreen
for a
global push to capitalise on the latest medical novelty device. The
retractable
syringe is a mega-fraud of chilling proportions by corporate snake-oil
salesmen
aided and abetted by corrupt politicians.
Underpinning
the premise that the world ''needs'' these 21st century syringes,
is the inescapable fact that unsafe injecting practices continue to
play a
major role in the spread of blood-borne viruses (BBVs) such as HIV and
hepatitis C (HCV). But that is one of the few truisms in what is a lie
of gargantuan
proportions. Against this backdrop, has come the retractable, the
invention of
which is being billed by a cabal of manufacturers as the ''ultimate
solution
to
unsafe injecting practices". (2)
The retractable will cost as much as 10 times more than conventional
syringes
and this threatens to trigger an increase in unsafe injecting practices
in
health-care settings in developing countries, and among people who
inject
illicit drugs. This could trigger a disastrous increase in HIV and HCV
transmission rates, rather than end the pandemics, as promised by the
corporations developing and/or producing retractables.
Healthcare
workers in developing countries are forced to
reuse syringes because they just do not have the funds to purchase the
necessary medical equipment. People who inject illicit drugs share
injecting
equipment when they don’t have access to injecting equipment. There is
no “ultimate solution” to
unsafe injecting practices but syringe companies could
put a major dent in the HIV pandemic by donating syringes to countries
that
can’t afford them and by aggressively lobbying governments to drop the
failed
war on drugs.
The
Corporations dictate government policy, they can end the
war on drugs. It is not surprising that they choose not to.
In
2003, nearly three million people died as a result of the
HIV pandemic. In the same year, the world’s leading syringe
manufacturer,
Becton Dickinson made a five hundred million dollar profit (US).
In line with their focus on
“aggressively increasing revenue growth” the
corporation has put profits firmly ahead of the millions of people
around the
world affected by BBVs.
Australian
companies are circling like vultures trying to
get a piece of the retractable syringe pie. They are misleading
governments,
lying to investors and capitalising on the growing numbers of HIV and
HCV infections worldwide.
Our
elected representatives are backing the corporations all
the way, one has even joined them. When you realise that former federal
health
minister Michael Wooldridge is on the payroll of Ritract, an Australian
retractable syringe company, it becomes clear that profit has been the
driving
force behind this initiative all along.
Retractable
syringes are a chilling reminder that if we are
serious about addressing the HIV pandemic we cannot rely on the
corporate
stooges that we call “democratic” governments. It is time we took
action
ourselves and I don’t mean forming another committee to discuss the
“issues”.
Corporations now dictate policy to our docile “leaders”.
The real cause
of the
global HIV pandemic is corporate domination.
If
our elected representatives will not show leadership, we
must show leadership ourselves.
Crisis
point: the leadership void
“We
can halt the spread of AIDS. We can even reverse it . . . Above all,
the
challenge of AIDS is a test of leadership. Leadership has formed the
basis of
whatever progress we have achieved so far.”
Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United
Nations
Kofi Annan's
call for leadership to stem the global HIV pandemic comes as
increasing numbers of people become infected with the virus. According
to
UNAIDS, an estimated 4.8 million people became newly infected with HIV
in 2003.
This is more than in any one year before. Today, some 37.8
million people
are living with HIV, which killed 2.9 million in 2003, and more than 20
million
since the first cases of AIDS were identified in 1981.(3)
Today’s
youth generation is the largest in history: nearly
half of the global population is less than 25 years old. They have not
known a
world without AIDS. (3)
UNAIDS estimates that unless
efforts to
fight the pandemic are stepped up, there will be 45 million new
infections by
2010. Unsafe injecting practices dominate HIV transmission rates in Asia
and Eastern Europe. Despite this, Kofi Annan's
call for
leadership has fallen on deaf ears. He himself has failed to show
leadership in
the face of this crisis, though his task is made more difficult because
groups
within the UN are at loggerheads about how to deal with the problem.
The International Narcotics Control Board
is
striving for a drug-free world, whereas UNAIDS realises that this is an
impossible dream and is calling for the implementation of harm
reduction (HR)
measures such as needle/syringe and substitution pharmacotherapy
programs.
While the World Health Organisation
and UNAIDS
have consistently expressed support for the introduction of NSPs to
reduce HIV
infection, neither has objected to the over-criminalisation of drug
users by UN
drug-control agencies. Even the UN General Assembly appears impotent.
In 1998,
participants pledged to eliminate or significantly reduce
drug-trafficking and
drug-use by 2008. Just a few years later, in 2001, the assembly
endorsed
efforts to reduce HIV transmission which included the establishment of
needle
and syringe programs (NSPs). (4)
Governments have also failed to show effective leadership. According to
the
Open Society Institute, "There
is no
question . . . that a divided approach to drug use and HIV is already
common in
countries with injection-driven epidemics, and that the split appears
to be
accelerating, rather than containing, the spread of HIV.”
(4)
This lack of leadership on an international and national level left the
door
wide open to a coup by the corporate sector which, with true capitalist
diligence, has taken on the mantle of "our leader". Strategies are
based on the level of profit they can generate. Sadly, the number of
human
lives saved is secondary.
Announcing the appointment of former Eli
Lilly
CEO Randall
Tobias
(below left) as Coordinator of his Global AIDS Initiative, US President
George
Bush said: "I have chosen a superb
leader who knows a great deal about lifesaving medicines, and who knows
how to
get results." (5)
Fascism:
1. A philosophy or system of government
that exercises a dictatorship of the extreme right,
typically through the merging of state and business leadership,
together with an ideology of belligerent nationalism. (6)
The response of
the major pharmaceuticals to the production of cheap
anti-retroviral drugs by developing nations is a well known example of
the corporate
approach to human life. But the retractable syringe and the motives
behind
it are not so well known. (7,8)
Syringe manufacturing is a multibillion-dollar industry dominated by
three
corporate giants, Becton Dickinson, Tyco Healthcare, a division of
Kendall, and Terumo, and
their market
power allows them to keep syringe costs artificially high. An
inevitable
result is the reuse of syringes by health-care workers in developing
countries and in some regions, people who inject
illicit drugs.
According to the New Jersey-based BD, 16 billion injections are
administered
worldwide every year. In the developing world, as many as 40 per cent
are given
with reused syringes, exposing people seeking medical care to possible
infection by a BBV.
To say that BD did well in 2003 would be an understatement. Reported
revenues
increased 12 per cent to $4.528 billion and net income, by 14 per cent
to $547
million. Like all true capitalists, however, BD want bigger profit
margins and
in a letter to shareholders, Edward J. Ludwig - who is lucky enough to
be not
only BD's chairman, but its president and CEO - said:
“Over the course of our history, BD has
made important contributions to better health the world over. Yet, it
is the
way we have gone about our business that brings to life a key BD
character
trait: We are never satisfied with our accomplishments.” In his letter, Ludwig (below) outlines the core
strategies of BD which include "to
aggressively increase revenue
growth". (9)
The
means to this end is the retractable: no more reuse of
the conventional first-generation device by people who inject illicit
drugs or
by poorer countries forced to such recourse because costs prevent
renewal of
each ''sharp'' as it is used. Along comes BD and Co. who, in what might
have
been a moment of drug-induced entrepreneurial genius, come up with the
magic
formula to milk profit from each and every one of their syringes. Not
only do
they blast profits into the ionosphere, they plug the ''money hole'' of
reusability.
Tyco Health Care - which has made no secret of its ''aggressive
organic growth effort” - was recently awarded a
contract worth well over $100 million to supply its retractables to US
hospitals. Japan's Terumo is almost soothing in its stated aims: "By . . . introducing a range of
products to prevent infection and reduce risk to patients and medical
practitioners, (Terumo) advance our longstanding commitment to offer
products
that are as safe, patient-friendly and trouble-free as possible . . .
Ultimately, such peace of mind is priceless.” (10,11)
Corporate
leadership
Chris Talbot, writing for the World
Socialist
Website, puts it simply: "The
massive gap between what could be done and what is being done about
HIV/AIDS is
an indictment of the entire capitalist system. When a
small group of wealthy people holds in their hands the means to
prolong the lives of millions and refuse to give what is needed, the
only
answer is for the majority to take these selfishly hoarded resources
and put
them to use.” (7)
The syringe giants had to
create a demand for a product that wasn't really
needed. They used industry associations such as the Healthcare
Leadership Council and the Advanced Medical Technology
Association (AdvaMed) to lobby aggressively for legislation
mandating the
use of retractable syringes in the US
and beyond. It didn't take long for individual states to tow the
line. (12,13)
as at the date of publication (14)
Ludwig, a board
member of both organisations, was recently elected
chairman of New Jersey-based Health Care Institute of New Jersey (HINJ)
whose
membership, as stated on the HINJ site, ".
. . is comprised of 20 research-based pharmaceutical and medical
technology
companies. These companies, many of them world leaders in their field,
play a
major role in determining the state's economic well being and quality
of life.”
(15)
HLC
and AdvaMed play the same role at a national and
international level. HLC's members include Pfizer Inc, Merck
&
Company, Inc., Johnson & Johnson,
and Abbott
Laboratories.
HLC bills itself as the "exclusive
forum for the leaders of our nation's health care system to jointly
develop
policies, plans and programs to achieve their vision of a 21st century
health
care system.” (12)
AdvaMed has a similar membership. According to AdvaMed, the US
is a major exporter of medical devices, with companies exporting $17.4
billion
in 2000 - a whopping 22 per cent of total US
production. AdvaMed claims its members produce nearly 90 per cent of
the $71
billion worth of health care technology products consumed annually in
the US,
and nearly 50 per cent of the $169 billion purchased around the world
annually.
(13)
HINJ, AdvaMed and HLC are where the drug companies and the
drug-delivery
companies collaborate to ensure mutual benefits for shareholders.
The role of the medical technology companies cannot be overstated. An
article
in the March 2002
edition
of Bioshares, an independent Australian biotech investment
magazine,
reported that there were now 400 companies throughout the world with
more than
a dozen Australian companies active in the sector. (16)
Bioshare's editors argue that: "Drug delivery technologies have proven
to
be a viable tool to provide what is called 'life cycle management' of
valuable
pharmaceutical products." So viable, the world drug-delivery market was
valued at $69 billion. Although well short of the global pharmaceutical
market
of $330 billion, the industry is growing at twice the rate of the
pharmaceuticals. (16)
It is not surprising that Edward J Ludwig has been listed in Forbes'
America's Most Powerful People. These
so-called
industry associations and the syringe manufacturing companies are
powerful
pressure groups, and they probably rate third behind the military and
prison
industrial complexes in the US.
(17)
The
retractable syringe, serving no real purpose, was a
hard-sell to the US
health system. BD directors realised that government regulation was the
only
way to guarantee a market for their expensive product. In June, 1998,
Ludwig's
predecessor, Clateo Castellini, wrote a letter
to all
members of the US Congress in which he said:
"The
cost
pressures that currently exist in the health care industry . . .
directly
affect which products are available to those providing care to
patients. It may
be the case that the availability of medical supplies with safety
features is
significantly impacted by these factors. Some
form of regulation or other government involvement may be required to
address
this problem.”
"I
want to stress
that Becton Dickinson would support government action to further ensure
health
care worker safety, including legislation, regulations, guidelines, or
other
solutions . . . we would appreciate the opportunity to participate in
the
evolving discussion of this issue in partnership with government
leaders.”
(18)
It
didn't take long for the US
government to meet the demands of our new leaders. On October 3, 2000, the House
of
Representatives passed the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act.
This was
the first in a series of steps required to mandate the use of
retractable
syringe technology in the US Health Care system by 2007. The
legislation passed
the Senate
on October 26 and was signed by President
Bill Clinton on November 6 (below). (19,20,21)
BD shareholders
are already benefiting from the legislation.
This is clear from their 2003 annual report: "U.S.
revenues from safety-engineered devices increased 19 percent to $680
million, keeping this category our largest single driver of
revenue." They are doing so well, they have announced plans
to
discontinue US sales of many conventional sharps products.
An
example of the intensity of competition, is the $US100
million paid by BD to Retractable
Technologies Inc to settle accusations that it had used its
commercial
muscle to block rival products from reaching US hospitals. (22,23)
Even
the war on terror is no obstacle to BD: "The
non-discretionary nature of our
core products, our international diversification, and our ability to
meet the
needs of the worldwide healthcare industry . . . will continue to
cushion the
long-term impact on BD of potential economic and political dislocations
in the
countries in which we do business, including the effects of possible
healthcare
system reforms.” (9)
The
only challenge remaining for the drug-delivery industry
is to sell their lie to the rest of the world - a task made easier by US
global hegemony and the various Free Trade Agreements that are
spreading like a
cancer around the globe.
Big Lie No. 1:
Needlestick injuries
Occupational
settings
The Australian National Hepatitis Resource Manual (2001) states: "In the health care setting, the risk
of getting hepatitis C from a needlestick injury is estimated to
between 2% and
8%. This contrasts with a needlestick injury risk of 0.3% for HIV, and
30% for
hepatitis B." These figures are supported by the US Centre
for
disease control and prevention. The CDC puts it succinctly: HCV "is not transmitted efficiently through
occupational exposures to blood.” (24)
If you believe the syringe companies, the numbers of health care
workers living
with HIV or hep C because of needlestick injuries at work have reached
plague
proportions. Terumo tells us that 600,000 to 800,000 injuries occur
annually in
the US.
Australia's
very own Unitract,
quoting BD, claims that in 1998 at least 13,000 health care workers in
Australian hospitals had a needlestick injury. If true, this is an
unbelievable 35 per
day. (25,26)
Even
The Australian has fallen for the con. In his
advertorial of June
23, 2004, "Syringe makers take
the plunge", ''reporter'' James Dunn cut-and-pasted the press
releases
disgorged by the company, stating: "In
the developed world, there are an estimated 1million needlestick
injuries
(NSIs) - accidental prickings - among healthcare professionals a year,
with a
treatment cost of $6billion." (27)
This seems highly unlikely in light of statistics provided
by the
US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention which reported a total of
11,784
exposures to blood and body fluids from June 1996 through November,
2000 (24)
Data from Canada also refutes the manufacturers' line. Only 626
exposures had
been reported through the Canadian national surveillance system as of
January,
1996. (28)
What the manufacturers don't tell us is that injuries from hypodermic
needles
are only a small component of overall needlestick injuries.
Manufacturers are
using the term needlestick injury to describe a range of percutaneous
(skin
penetration) injuries, which put health-care workers at risk of
contracting a
BBV. As can be seen in the graphic below, only 29 per cent of
percutaneous
injuries were related to hypodermic needles. Butterflies and
intravenous
catheters have been associated with a high proportion of needlestick
injuries
in healthcare settings.
There are many
cheaper ways to reduce the risk of BBV transmission from
hypodermic needle injuries than introducing retractable syringes. Canada's
CCOHS report a number of factors that could increase the possibility of
needlestick injuries -
- "Work conditions that might
contribute to an increase in the number of needlestick injuries
include:
- staff reductions where
nurses, laboratory personnel and students assume additional duties.
- difficult patient care
situations.
- working at night with
reduced lighting."
The
CCOHA reports that inexperienced staff or students are
at a higher risk of needlestick injuries. Failure to comply with basic
protocols account for a substantial amount of occupational BBV
transmission, "while recapping (which) can account
for 25 to 30 percent of all needlestick injuries of nursing and
laboratory
staff. Often, it is the single most common cause . . . up to 30 percent
of
needlestick injuries of nursing and laboratory staff occur when workers
attempt
to dispose of needles using sharps containers." (28)
It
is fair to say that with nurse shortages forcing greater
work loads on hospital staff, there will inevitably be a greater risk
of
needlestick injuries. But this supposed epidemic of such occupational
injuries
can be easily contained by improving conditions of health workers and
by
developing and implementing workplace protocols and guidelines around
blood
awareness.
Healthcare workers in Australia
have been relatively quiet on this issue. This contrasts with the
approach of
the American Nursing Association who have established a website devoted
to
increasing awareness of issues surrounding needlestick injuries. The
ANA
doesn't tell readers that the site
is
funded by none other than BD. (30,31)
This
is not to say that needlestick injuries are not an
issue that needs to be addressed. In Australia,
three health care workers have died as a result of exposure to HIV in
healthcare settings since 1993. The issue at stake here is the motive
of the
corporations, beating up hysteria in order to maximise profits. The
needlestick
issue pales in comparison to the millions of people dieing from HIV
because of
unsafe injecting practices. (32)
Even the
Australian government has been forced to admit that
the demand for retractable syringes in Australian healthcare settings
is very
low. Then Federal Health Minister Senator Kay Patterson told the senate
in June
2002: “Uptake of currently available
technology
in health care settings has been low.” (33)
Needlestick injuries in
public spaces
Confirming funding for the Australian trial of retractable syringes in
May
2002, Senator Kay Patterson told the Senate "we
want to make our public places safer for our children. So the
Government will
fund a strategy for the introduction of retractable needle and syringe
technology into Australia.” Patterson failed to
mention the consequences of the war on drugs and zero-tolerance
policing.
Drug-users are often forced "underground", where they are forced to
weigh the odds of safely disposing of injecting equipment, and being
busted on
their way to the local NSP. (34)
Running the
gauntlet this way is just one aspect of the war on drugs being
waged at the street level, and which is evidenced in Australia
by sniffer dogs at big-city train stations and random police searches.
The
effects of zero-tolerance are harshest in cities such as Melbourne and
Sydney,
where all but the richest drug-users have reason to be concerned for
their
rights. Yet the fact remains, in the right environment and with the
right
information, people who inject drugs safely dispose of injecting
equipment. (35,36)
Even
in Australia,
people in possession of used needles and syringes still face
“self-administration” charges if arrested.
In
the June edition of the Journal of Paediatrics and Child
Health, a Royal Melbourne Children’s Hospital study of 50 children over
a
period of 32 months who had sustained community needlestick injuries,
found
that none had contracted HIV, HBV or hep C, despite evidence that HIV
remained
viable in a syringe for four weeks, HCV for five months, and HBV for 12
months.
(37)
The
findings of this study are supported by much bigger
studies in Rome (408) and Madrid
(249). In those studies there were no cases of HIV infection among
patients who
had suffered a needlestick injury. (38)
Delegates at the 2004 ANEX Harm Reduction Conference were told that
syringes
are a strong symbol of fear and that their presence can contribute to
an
increased perception of danger. This is despite the fact, always
ignored by the
Murdoch press, that there are no known cases of transmission of BBVs
through
needlestick injuries sustained by members of the public in Australia.
(39)
It
is reasonable to suggest that the risk of contracting a
BBV from a needle/syringe discarded inappropriately in a public place -
one
subject to the ravages of time and weather - is much lower than in an
occupational setting. Community perceptions about the dangers of
discarded
sharps are a result of the low level of understanding within the
community of
BBVs in general and the deliberate stigmatisation and demonisation of
people
who inject drugs by governments at all levels.
A fundamental fact ignored by the syringe manufacturers and governments
alike
is that people who inject illicit drugs dispose of injecting equipment
appropriately more than ninety-nine per cent of the time. In fact they
feel
they have a responsibility to do so. When they don’t, it is nearly
always
because of government policy. (35,36).
Big
lie No. 2: Unsafe injecting practices
Unsafe
injecting practices in health-care settings
"Every year Sub-Saharan Africa
spends $14.5 billion dollars repaying debts to the world’s rich
countries and
international institutions. Often they spend so much on debt payments
that they
have very little left over for health or education– in Nigeria,
debt payments are eleven times higher than
the national health budget.” (40)
The reason
syringes are reused in the first place, is because health-care
agencies in poorer countries can't afford to buy them. The World Health
Organisation makes a lie of anything to contrary:
"Adequate supplies should be made
available to comply with basic infection control standards, even in
resource
constrained settings. Provision of
single use, disposable injection equipment matching deliveries of
injectable
substances, disinfectants and 'sharps' containers should be the
norm in all
health care settings. Attention should also be paid to protective
equipment and
water supplies . . . While running water may not be universally
available,
access to sufficient water supplies should be ensured.” (41)
The key WHO recommendation is that drug companies should
provide the required amount of injecting equipment with drugs that they
sell.
This is easy enough, especially when the drug companies and syringe
manufacturers are sitting around the table together in New
Jersey. Obviously they have decided that to do
this
would not be in line with their aim of “aggressively
increasing revenue growth.”
The
retractable syringe will not be the ultimate solution to
unsafe injecting practices in the developing world. If anything, the
cost of
the device will force healthcare workers to reuse conventional syringes
more
times than they do at the moment. There is no guarantee that
retractable
syringes can’t be reused and it won’t take long for people in desperate
situations to work out how to disable the retract mechanism.
Another ignored
factor in the global HIV pandemic is war. BD may be protected
against the impact of “political dislocation” but for many healthcare
workers,
adhering to the WHO protocol is extremely difficult, sometimes
impossible,
wherever there is armed conflict. (3)
Unsafe
injecting practices by people who inject illicit drugs
Syringe
manufacturers claim that the retractable syringe
will save millions of lives by preventing unsafe needle use. What they
don’t
point out is that unless countries move away from the zero tolerance
approach
to drug use and implement needle and syringe programs in the first
place the
retractable syringe is useless.
As
previously identified, the UN's contradictory approach to
the enormous web of issues surrounding the HIV-illicit drug equation is
preventing
any real reduction in the rate of HIV transmission.
"Drug-use and HIV vulnerability
remain issues of great concern for many countries in Asia and the Pacific . . . in
some geographical areas, more than 60 per
cent of all drug-users are HIV positive.” In Indonesia, the
rate of
spread 1999 and 2003 was three-fold - from 16 per cent to 48 per cent. (3,42)
Eastern Europe has similarly high rates of
infection
among people who inject drugs and in Russia,
a staggering 90 per cent of people diagnosed with HIV in 2002 were
injectors.
In 2002, people who inject drugs accounted for more than 10 per cent of
all
reported HIV infections in Western Europe. In
the United States,
which shuns NSPs, about 25 per cent
of HIV infections are attributed to drug injecting. (3)
The prevalence of hep C among people who inject drugs in all those
countries
where it is present, are higher than rates of HIV infection. In Australia,
more than a quarter of a million people have been affected by the
virus. As
Stuart Loveday, president of the Australian Hepatitis Council told ABC
Radio on
August 28, 2003, hep C ''shows no signs of slowing." (43)
Epidemics that the syringe companies purport to be able to halt with
their new
device could be addressed for a tenth of the cost with conventional
syringes -
something that is being conveniently omitted from the marketing
campaigns. There
is a common denominator wherever the rates of HIV are high among people
who
inject illicit drugs; the lack of government-supported NSPs, or where
they are
present, their extremely limited resources and scope. Many NSPs around
the
world face a mammoth task in the face of criticism from the media and
politicians
and in some countries, arrest, beatings, or death.
Paradoxically, Australia,
where governments at all levels are hell-bent on taking the country
back to the
1950s, has provided NSP services second to none. Statistics show that
less than
four per cent of HIV infections are related to injecting drug use which
is a
record to be proud of. Even more encouraging is the fact that only one
per cent
of NSP attendees are HIV positive. It isn’t all good news; the rate of
HIV
among indigenous Australians who inject drugs has reached alarming
levels and needs
urgent action. (32)
Rather than waste money on research and development, BD or Tyco
Healthcare
could donate the equivalent of a tenth of their profits in syringes for
NSPs in
developing countries, directly contributing to a major reduction in the
transmission of HIV among people who inject drugs. Instead, through
their
representatives HINJ, HLC, AdvaMed and the like, they provide implicit
support
for US governments that drive the global war on drugs.
They even have
an awards
program for politicians who have toed their line. HLC have the "Medical Miracles Award” that "salutes
outstanding achievements by a
lawmaker in the health care arena.” and AdvaMed gives awards for
service to
the medical device industry and the US Food and Drug Administration. (44,45)
The failure of
these corporate "leadership" bodies to lobby against the war on drugs
is evidence that they are benefitting from the drug prohibition. The
ongoing drug prohibition is playing a major role in the high rates of
BBV transmission among people who inject drugs. The retractable syringe
will not be able to address this serious policy issue.
A significant reason for the failure to adopt NSPs is because "governments anxious to adhere to the
terms of the UN Convention of drugs sometimes misinterpret the meanings
and
intent of the conventions.” (42)
In the joint UNAIDS-UNDCP study in Asia, Drug
use and
HIV vulnerability, three issues are identified as barriers to effective
implementation of HR polices and strategies:
"The
first is the
criminalisation and punishment of drug-use itself.
The
second concerns
the possession of needles and syringes and other drug use paraphernalia
and the
extent to which these may be used as evidence in convicting drug users
for
possession and use.
The
third concerns the
legitimacy of prescribing opioid agonist pharmacotherapy as a
maintenance
substitution treatment." (42)
Retractable
syringes will not stop these problems. There are
many other factors that need to be taken into account when communities
try to address
the transmission of BBVs via unsafe injecting practices.
An
important cultural factor ignored by syringe
manufacturers affecting the rate of BBV infection among people who
inject drugs
in the South-East and South Asia regions is"the
use of self-made injecting equipment” and “ . . . the
presence of 'professional' injectors who use the same
needle and syringe to inject many customers, sometimes dipping the
equipment
into pots of opium that are contaminated with blood.” (46)
Viruses such as HIV and the more virulent hepatitis C can survive
outside the
body, contaminating other equipment used in the injecting process and
the drug
mix itself. (46)
According to the National Hepatitis C Resource Manual,
"safer using means more than just using new and sterile needles
and syringes. It includes being aware of how easy it is for blood to be
transmitted. People may come into contact with someone else's blood
when
sharing any injecting equipment. Blood from used needles and syringes,
tourniquets and fingers - even in microscopic amounts - can get into a
shared
mix, filters or water and onto injection sites.” (47)
Our prisons are another problem for the corporations who are promoting
their
new invention as the panacea for unsafe injecting practices.
The
ever-expanding prison-industrial complex is a breeding
ground for BBVs. Dr Margaret Hillard, from the Macfarlane Burnet
Institute for
Medical Research and Public Health, told this year's ANEX Conference
that 68 per
cent of prisoners in Victoria
with a history of injecting drug-use were hepatitis C positive. As
well, she
said that 70 per cent of prisoners with a history of IDU reported
injecting
drugs while in prison. Prophetically, Ms Hillard added that "continuing
to incarcerate drug-users
as a solution to the drug problem is negligent.” (48)
This highlights the fundamental flaws in the retractable, whose
''healing
qualities'' are not up to such a complex problem.
To the contrary, the retractable could well increase rates of BBV among
people
who inject drugs. People will not be used to the new piece of equipment
and it
is probable that more of them will be forced to help each other to
inject. Drug-user advocates are concerned that mandatory
replacement of
conventional syringes with retractables will result in a black market
for
conventional syringes, with the attendant risk that these will be
reused as
they become scarce. (49)
They argue
exorbitant cost will be a further impediment to
the introduction of NSPs in countries still debating the legitimacy of
such a
program.
There is also the risk of blood-spatter on retraction of the needle,
further
increasing the risk of blood-sharing.
There are proven cost-effective responses to this challenge, including
minor changes
to legislation, implementation of NSPs and outreach services, and most
importantly, peer-education programs run for and by people who inject
drugs.
Government must engage with this target group if they are to ever to
check the
rate of BBV transmission in their regions. (50)
Australia’s
needle and syringe programs are the best example of a cost-effective
response
to the HIV and hepatitis C pandemics. According to the Australian
Government
Return on Investment in Needle/Syringe Programs report, approximately
25,000
HIV infections by 2000 are estimated to have been prevented among
people who
inject drugs since the introduction of NSPs in 1988, and by 2010
approximately
4,500 deaths are projected to have been prevented. (51)
There
are similar results for hepatitis C. “By
the year 2000, approximately 21,000 HCV infections are estimated to
have been
prevented among injecting drug users since the introduction of NSPs in
1988,
(of which approximately 16,000 would have developed chronic HCV); while
by 2010
approximately 650 fewer injecting drug users are projected to be living
with
cirrhosis and 90 HCV-related deaths would have been prevented.” (51)
For
an investment as low as $141 million between 1991 and 2000, total
treatment costs avoided over the life of the cases of HIV and HCV
avoided by
NSPs are approximately $7,808 million (Australian dollars). (51)
“In
summary, the study indicates that the
financial return on investment will
exceed manyfold the original investment in NSPs, and that the original
investment
had been fully recouped and surpassed by the end of the investment
period,
before any future savings are taken into account. The investment in
NSPs is
justified by the effect on HIV alone, with the effect on HCV providing
an
additional financial benefit, albeit a smaller one than HIV.” (51)
This
has
been achieved without retractable syringes.
Retractable syringes in Australia
The
Wooldridge Trial
“Whether or not we display this
leadership will be the mark by which our grandchildren will judge us.”
The Hon. Michael
Wooldridge – 25th June 2001
– UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS
It is nearly
three years since the announcement that the
Australian Federal Government would fund a trial of retractable
syringes.
Billed as the ultimate solution to unsafe injecting practices, much of
the harm
reduction (HR) sector adopted a wait-and-see approach.
Workers expressed concerns about the impact of the trial on their
efforts to
reduce the number of HCV infections and maintain the very low
level of HIV among people who inject illicit drugs. Some workers saw it
as just
another attack on illicit drug-users by a government determined to make
every
aspect of our lives difficult. (49)
While some HR agencies and drug-user groups reluctantly participated in
the
retractable syringe trial, others called for a boycott of the process.
Those on
the ''inside'' outlined their own concerns. But the fact remained: the
initial
''sign-on'' was more like conscription and nobody really understood the
true
motivations behind the trial.
The Government was always going to introduce retractables whether we
liked them
or not. There was something else we didn't know about, the Wooldridge
connection.
Official
corruption
The retractable syringe adventure was set in motion by former federal
Health
Minister Michael Wooldridge before he resigned from federal parliament
in
September, 2001.
After
aggressive lobbying from syringe manufacturers, in
July, 2000, the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy set up a
sub-committee to
develop an options paper and cost benefits analysis on retractable
syringes. As
federal health minister, Wooldridge would have been present at the
meeting and
if not, he would have been privy to the discussions that took place
around
these syringes.
Wooldridge
has a history of corrupt behaviour. His
antecedence shows at least two scandals out
of which
he managed to wiggle his way unscathed. (52)
Wooldridge
left the big house under a cloud,
after
revelations that just before resigning, he had promised $5 million to
the Royal Australian
College
of General Practitioners. He was promptly employed as a consultant with
the
college. Before that was the controversial MRI scandal that blew up in
his face
in October 1999, in which he was accused of divulging sensitive
budgetary
information to radiologists over dinner. He escaped both
embarrassments, but
the public attention and aroma of corruption became too much for the
GPs who
were forced to
terminate
his contract in July 2002. (53,54)
At
least seven Australian companies stand to make a killing
from the introduction of retractables. For them, the Wooldridge Trial
is the
backdoor to distribution across the board, and not just into NSPs.
Unitract, Analytica, Medigard, Ensi-Med, Occupational Medical
Innovations, Eastland Medical Systems
and Ritract are just some of
the companies who are trying to break into the market. (26, 55, 56,57,58,59,60)
The government had assured stakeholders that the initiative would only
be
advertised within Australia
to ensure that an Australian company would successfully tender for the
trial. (61)
Our
sources indicate that only one Australian company
responded to the request for information for the Wooldridge Trial -
OMI. Others
included Texas-based Retractable Technologies Inc, with its Vanishpoint
syringe, and Lucra Trading (Securegard). At time of publishing, it is
believed
that the US
manufactured Vanishpoint had won favour.
Perusal of the companies' websites reveals certain striking
similarities. But
one company, Ritract, stands out for the fact that it has a former
federal
health minister on its team - the architect of the retractable trial,
Michael
Wooldridge. The company also aims to buy out other retractable syringe
patents,
so it is very useful to have Wooldridge, with access to privileged
information,
on their team. (62)
Wooldridge
timed his resignation perfectly, setting up a
buffer between the date he finished as health minister and the date of
commencement
of the pilots. He has done spectacularly well to keep his relationship
with the
company quiet. The
Australian is playing along with the appalling charade, with at
least two
of its scribes conveniently neglecting to mention that Wooldridge is on
the
Ritract take.
Three days after an advertorial by her co-staffer, James Dunne, the
Oz's Helen
Matterson beefed up the snow-job with a 13-paragraph piece that
included a plug
in the heading: "RiTract early jab
gets judge's points in contest". (63)
The Ritract
prospectus says it all: "From
1996 to 2001 he (Wooldridge) was a member of the Cabinet Budget
Committee
(Expenditure Review) and thus played an integral part in federal budget
allocations not only in the health sector but across all sectors of the
Australian government." (62)
And further: "Through his
supervision of the Health Insurance Commission, Dr Wooldridge had
overall
responsibility for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and for the
Therapeutic
Goods Administration in Australia.”
The Australian's pair of news hounds also failed to mention that
Wooldridge was
appointed by health minister Tony Abbott as the chair of the new
Ministerial
Advisory Council on AIDS, Sexual Health and Hepatitis (MACASHH),
which had its first meeting in March this year. This means that
Wooldridge will
still have his finger on the pulse and be able to steer Ritract toward
financial success. (64,65)
No
mention that he also served as the chair for the World
Health Organisation’s East Asia and Western Pacific Region and was also
Global
Chairman of UN AIDS, the peak UN body dealing with HIV. (66)
The
fact that Wooldridge continued to access his
parliamentary email account until March 2002 was also ignored. For four
months
Wooldridge had access to information that he should not have been privy
to. (65)
It's
no surprise that Ritract's is the second Australian
syringe to be approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration for
distribution
locally. As managing director Rupert Northcott told Helen Matterson: "We have managed to accelerate our
development to overtake other competitors in the syringe market,” (62)
The
1984 Readers Digest Great Illustrated Dictionary defines
corrupt as: "1. Immoral; perverted;
depraved. 2. Marked by or guilty of venality and dishonesty, especially
bribery.” A strong case has been made out for official corruption
- a
charge that
Wooldridge and some current cabinet members should forced to answer. (6)
The least the HR sector could do is demand Wooldridge be sacked from
MACASHH,
and that he and those MPs who have aided and abetted him, such as
Patterson,
Abbott and Howard, be arrested and put on trial.
As a
footnote, there are similarities between the Wooldridge
retractable trial and the MRI scam of 1998. In both scams he escaped
any
criminal charges. Both scams also relate to medical technologies that
Wooldridge has a financial interest in; the retractable syringe via
Ritract and
magnetic resonance imaging. Wooldridge was elected chairman of MRI
technology
company Resonance Health Limited in October 2003. (66)
Reaction
to the trial
The deceit had its genesis in September 2002, when the government
invited
industry to submit information on retractable needle and syringe
technology
already in the market place or under development. Interested companies
were
told that they may be invited to tender for the supply of retractables
for the
Wooldridge Trial.
In November 2002, the community sector was conscripted into the
process.
National "consultations" were held around Australia
to discuss the initiative and seek the views of stakeholders. People
from
government agencies and the health care sector, plus people who inject
drugs,
diabetics and retractable syringe manufacturers, attended the meetings.
Health
care workers and diabetics were never keen on the retractable.
They made their disdain clear, with the result that both sectors were
jettisoned by the Government, leaving people who inject illicit drugs
alone to
bare the dubious honour of being crash-test dummies for the Wooldridge
Trial.
Undeterred and indifferent in the face of universal rejection of the
concept,
the Government ran with the Trial. (61)
The
government even knew that the retractable syringes they
were trialling were not appropriate for the target group. Senator Kay
Patterson
told the Senate in June 2002: “There are
a number of designs of retractable needle and syringe technology,
either in the
prototype stage or currently available for use in Australia, and these are
predominantly suitable for use in health care settings by health care
workers
and not by people who self-administer injectable drugs.” (33)
An implementation reference group was established as a reference and
advisory
group to, as the government put it, "provide
independent advice to the Department on implementation of the
initiative . . .
comprised of stakeholders with a range of expertise relevant to
implementation
of the Initiative.” (67)
Stakeholders
included members of the Australian
Needle Exchange Association (ANEX). Also on board were
representatives of
those people the government and companies involved needed more than
anything to
legitimise the whole deal - illicit injectors themselves, via the
Australian Injecting and Illicit Drug
Users
League (AIVL). (68,69)
The Wooldridge Trial was revised in the 2003-04 Federal
Budget
and reduced to $17.5 million. Budget papers confirmed that retractables
would
be trialled only in NSPs and not in health-care settings. Some of the
initial
funding was to go towards development of prototypes. But when the
Government
admitted that some companies were already manufacturing retractables,
the
funding package was revised accordingly. (70)
Top secret
The Government obtained an ethics clearance easily for its prototype
trials on
NSP users. For the privilege of being a guinea pig for an unproven
piece of
equipment, each participant receives a small monetary reward. With
enormous
veils of secrecy flapping from the masts, it was plain sailing for the
government and by mid-2004, retractables were being trialled in NSPs in
at
least three cities. (71)
The government is being so secretive about the Wooldridge Trial that
they have
forced the members of their implementation reference group to sign a
“deed of
confidentiality”. (61)
The
Wooldridge Trial is being conducted by the Department of
Health and Ageing's population health division. The department's website
suggests
that everything is kosher. The truth is, the Trial is far from
transparent, and
should be retitled the retractable X Files. So anxious are the people
driving
this scam to conceal details, they have gone all-out to hush up events
such as this
year's ANEX HR conference, which was told unabashedly by one speaker
that NSPs
and companies participating in the pilots would not be named.
The speaker, Jennie Shortt, was assistant director for the retractable
needle-syringe technology intitiative, and her job was always going to
be
difficult - trying the hard-sell on a room full of NSP workers
vehemently
opposed to retractables. Her talk was not well received but she did let
slip
one line that summed up the entire modus operandi: ''We
need to be strategic and calculated in how we do this.”
One journalist who did not hear these prophetic words was Radio Triple
J's Ali
Benton. In an astonishing demonstration of what our leaders think
should and
should not go on the public record, conference organisers ejected her
before Ms
Shortt began speaking. Later, Ms Benton interviewed several delegates.
But curiously,
her reports never reached the airwaves, suggesting that censorship was
at work
outside the conference as well as within.
For
the record, one of the participant NSPs was Sydney's
Kirketon Road Centre. The Sydney
based drug user group, the NSW Users and AIDS Association withdrew from
the
trial “due to concerns about the safety of the proposed retractable
syringes.”
(72)
Experimenting
on human subjects
Aside from the Wooldridge connection, there are many reasons why the
outrageous
Wooldridge Trial should never have been allowed to proceed. It is a
human
rights covenant, however, the Nuremberg Code,
which alone is sufficient to force the Trial's immediate abandonment.
The Code
was drawn up in 1946 during the Nuremberg Trials, in which 23 Nazi
physicians
went on trial for crimes committed against prisoners of war. It
consists of 10
conditions that must be met to justify research involving human
subjects. (73)
Half-a-century later, the Wooldridge Trial was granted its ethics
clearance by
the Australian government. Though a political initiative, the Trial is
being
conducted by a private Sydney
firm,
the Research Forum, which is faced with the impossible task of
conducting the
trial in an ethical manner.
The Forum's past customers include, AusIndustry, the Australian Customs
Service, the Australian Taxation Office, Centrelink (Australia's
welfare
payment agency), the Commonwealth Department of Finance, the Department
of
Immigration and of course, the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia. (74)
After a presentation by the Forum's Dr Fadil Pedic, at this year's ANEX
Harm Reduction conference, it
becomes
startlingly clear that the Trial violates almost all of the Code's
principles.
The Code states:"The protagonists of
the practice of human experimentation (must) justify their views on the
basis
that such experiments yield results for the good of society that are
unprocurable by other methods or means of study . . . however . . .
certain
basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical
and legal
concepts.” (73)
The failure of the Trial to comply with the Code's principles should be
grounds
for the cessation the Trial.
Principle 1: ". . . consent . . . is
absolutely essential (and the subject)
must have legal capacity to give consent”. There is also reference
to fraud
and deceit, and the stipulation that volunteers have "sufficient
knowledge and comprehension of . . . the subject matter” so they
can make an informed decision. They should be privy
to all possible "inconveniences and hazards”
that might arise from the experiment.
The consent form issued to participants states:
"Potential physical risks include
skin irritation or bruising due to using a different syringe type.
Potential
psychological risks include distress, fear, anxiety and frustration
associated
with trying the new syringe type, completing the survey or taking part
in the
focus group or being asked to do any of these.” (75)
The Forum has conveniently left out reference to other possible harms
associated with injecting drug use such as vein collapse, complications
associated with injecting into arteries, "dirty hits'', impact on the
immune system, endocarditis, abscesses, overdose, septicaemia, tetanus,
embolism, not to mention the risk of arrest and incarceration by
police. (46)
They also ignore risks associated with the presence of blood and fail
to warn
participants about other things that could potentially increase the
risk of BBV
transmission, such as helping each other use the devices, and the risk
of
blood-splatter when the syringe retracts. Yet in the Forum's
methodology
document, they merely state: "While
vein care problems and infection are risks associated with injecting
and
injecting drug users, there is no evidence to suggest participation in
the
current study will increase these risks.” This is a cynical way for
the
Forum to say that " 'junkies' are
taking these risks anyway, and therefore we don't have to worry about
that
stuff". (71)
This clause in principle one is also a worry: "The duty
and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the
consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in
the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be
delegated
to another with impunity.”
Responsibility for recruitment of Trial participants has been delegated
to
assistants who, while qualified to meet the requirements of most NSPs,
have
neither the knowledge nor expertise to conduct the Wooldridge Trials.
The Forum
has contravened the above clause by delegating responsibility with
impunity. (71)
Principle 2: “The
experiment should
. . . yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by
other
methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.”
The Wooldridge trial is the most cynical exercise in making a cabal of
powerful
corporations richer. No good will come from it.
Principle 3: which states that "anticipated
results (should) justify .
. . the experiment”' - invalidates the Trial because of the
fallacious
arguments that brought it into being,
Principle
4: “The experiment should be so
conducted as to
avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.”
This
experiment is conducted by the subjects of the Trial
themselves, people who inject drugs. On attending their local NSP,
service
users are asked to participate in the Trial. Volunteers are given a
package of
retractable syringes to take home (if they have one) to inject illicit
substances
without any supervision whatsoever from the Trial organisers. (71)
The
researchers would require a change in commonwealth and
state/territory legislation if they were to properly comply with the
Code's
fourth principle. It would be illegal for researchers to assist or
observe the
volunteers with the drug administration process, they could be charged
with
"administering a dangerous drug to another person". This important
legal point ensures that the fourth principle of the Nuremberg Code
cannot be
complied with in the current climate.
Principle
6: "The degree of risk to be taken
should
never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the
problem to
be solved by the experiment.”
"Humanitarian
importance'' has nothing to do with the
Wooldridge Trial. As clearly indicated by the evidence, the retractable
syringe
will have a limited impact on the HIV/hep C pandemics. There is
however, a
degree of risk that as nations mandate the use of these devices - at
the behest
of their corporate leaders - rates of transmission of BBVs will
increase.
Principle 7: "Proper preparations
should be made and adequate facilities
provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote
possibilities
of injury, disability, or death.”
As
previously stated, volunteers are provided with a package
of retractable syringes to take-away from the premises and use at their
home or
usual place of injection. Volunteers are not supervised at any stage of
the
injection process, due to the legal minefield facing the Forum and the
Government. The only facilities provided for volunteers in the
Wooldridge Trial
are a website and a 1800 phone number, and a small monetary reward as
compensation - hardly adequate enough to "protect . . . against
even
remote possibility of injury". (71)
Principle
8: "The experiment should be
conducted
only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill
and care
should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who
conduct or
engage in the experiment.”
The
volunteers in this Trial are forced to test this
experimental medical device on themselves, without adequate supervision
or
facilities. The volunteers in the trial receive no training whatsoever
prior to
their involvement, they are laypeople and should not be expected to
conduct
this experiment on themselves. (71)
The
Nuremberg Code determines "criminal culpability and
punishment" and should have been the reference point when determining
whether or not the Wooldridge Trial received its ethics clearance.
Calling on the watchdogs - ACCC, ASIC, TGA
Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission
Complicit companies have embarked down the well-travelled road of
misinformation and deception. Health-care workers are being misled,
governments
are being duped and investors are being sold a croc.
The
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), a supposedly
independent Commonwealth statutory authority formed to administer the
Trade
Practices Act, needs to take action to stop this diabolical
fraud. (76)
The ACCC makes it clear that staff and representatives of organisations
can not
mislead or deceive, regardless of whether the misrepresentation is
deliberate
or accidental. "What matters is the impression left in the customer's
mind." All of the retractable companies are breaching Section
52 of the Trade Practices Act and relevant legislation in the
state/territory in which they are based. This deception is so
widespread and
extreme, that it also breaches Section
51 of the Act which deals with "unconscionable conduct". (76)
Following are two examples of deliberate misrepresentation by
Australian
companies:
Case study 1
Needlestick injuries in occupational settings
Medigard
"Needlestick
injury, which occurs when a person is accidentally injured from a used
needle
point, is an increasing concern with medical staff and the community
exposed to
high risk blood borne diseases such as HIV-AIDS and Hepatitis B and C.”
(56)
Analytica
"Needlestick
injuries occur frequently in the healthcare industry. They are common,
dangerous and, in some cases, lethal . . . Injecting drug use is
increasing
across the world and coinciding with the ongoing epidemic in Hepatitis
C.”
(55)
We have already dispelled manufacturers' claims that there is an
epidemic of
needlestick injuries in occupational settings. Statements from Medigard
and
Analytica confirm that they are deliberately misrepresenting the need
and value
(both economical and social) of their product. All of the syringe
manufacturers
are making similar false claims.
Case study 2
Unsafe injecting practices
Unitract
"Unsafe
injections are the most common
cause of
Hepatitis C infection in developing and transitional countries."
(26)
Ritract
"Illicit drug users and people in
developing countries
are at risk from the re-use of needles and syringes." (60)
Despite
claims by Australia's
Unitract, it is clear from the evidence that this technology is not
"the
ultimate solution to unsafe injecting practices that will mean a safer
world
for everyone." (2)
According to the ACCC website, the failure to
make any
mention of an important matter in the context of an overall
presentation can sometimes
be misleading conduct. “What is not
mentioned may be an important element in
creating the correct overall impression about the product or service.”
Silence
can thus be conduct that misleads, or is likely to mislead. (76)
All of the Australian syringe
manufacturers are deliberately leaving out facts from their
presentations,
facts that blow the whole concept of retractable syringes out of the
water.
There is clear evidence of this omission of facts at each of the
websites of
the offending companies. The ACCC states that it makes no
difference
whether the omission is intentional or not in order to mislead. In this
case,
with all of the evidence in front of us, it is clear that these
companies are
either being run by morons, or that this is a calculated attempt to
mislead
governments and other potential buyers of their products.
The
ACCC also remind companies not to engage in
unconscionable conduct, what they describe as being
taken advantage of in a transaction in a way that offends the
conscience. When corporations start to
play on the deaths
of millions of people around the world to sell a product that is not
needed,
that is unconscionable conduct.
Therapeutic
Goods Administration
Australian
companies are also breaching the advertising
guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods Administration.
The TGA states: "Advertisements for
therapeutic goods, including devices, directed to consumers are
required to
comply with the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, Part 2 of the Therapeutic
Goods
Regulations 1990 and the (TGA) Advertising Code.” (77)
Goods advertised must . . . contain "correct
and balanced statements only and claims which the sponsor has already
verified”.
It seems unlikely that the advertisers in this case have
verified all of their claims. Unitract’s claim about “a safer world for
everyone” is absolutely ridiculous. When you note that Unitract
quote the
world’s leading syringe manufacturer BD rather than any credible
sources of
evidence it would seem that they are breaching TGA guidelines. The fact
is no
scientist in their right mind would verify the claims of syringe
manufacturers
that their invention will save millions of lives.
Advertisements
. . . "must not be
likely to arouse unwarranted or unrealistic expectations of product
effectiveness . . . mislead directly or by implication or through
emphasis,
comparisons, contrasts or omissions; abuse the trust or exploit the
lack of
knowledge of consumers or contain language which could bring about fear
or
distress (or) contain any claim, statement or implication that it is
infallible, unfailing, magical, miraculous, or that it is a certain,
guaranteed
or sure cure . . .” (77)
Abuse
of trust, exploitation of the lack of knowledge of consumers, sounds
like the
catchcry of the pharmaceutical industry. These are the tactics that
have been
adopted by Australian syringe manufacturing companies without
hesitation. In the introduction to this
article, the
manufacturers were compared with snake-oil salesmen. The syringe
lobbyists are
marketing their devices on the basis that they are going to save
millions of
lives and virtually end the HIV and hepatitis C pandemics.
The
response to these pandemics is complex on all levels,
economic, political and social. There is no magic bullet and it is
improper and
obscene for corporations to claim to be able to do so.
Australian Securities and Investment
Commission
Potential investors are required by law to be fully informed of a
company's
operation. The stupefying sums of projected income are one thing. But
it is
unlikely that in the least, investors and shareholders in companies
pushing for
the introduction of retractables are fully aware of the extent of
competition.
One company has already gone broke and the license to produce its
product,
Uniject, has been bought by BD.
Shareholders
would be concerned by two Sydney Morning Herald
reports from mid-January 2004 in which the business record of Unitract
CEO and
executive director Alan Shortall took a hammering, as did the company's
shares.
One name that leapt from the SMH of January 17, was that of disgraced
former New South Wales
detective Roger Rogerson, who is a
Shortall associate. The Scotsman of July 25 explored the magnitude and
volatility of competition. (23,78)
Unitract
is the best example of the deceptive baiting of
investors that syringe manufacturers in Australia
have engaged in over the past few years. This company has conned many
an
investor to back their syringe and they have grown substantially over
the past
few years. They fail to tell their investors that they are up against
four
hundred companies in the US
– and competition with those companies will be a reality now that we
have
signed the free trade agreement – and they fail to tell their investors
that
the whole size of the retractable syringe market relies on myths.
We can only
hope that ASIC will take some action against these companies for
misleading investors who risk losing millions of dollars. Ritract
deserves
special attention after the revelation that Michael Wooldridge has used
inside
information to benefit that company and in turn, himself.
Summary
Koffi
Annan's call for
leadership to tackle the HIV pandemic
has been hijacked by corporations whose primary stated aim is to
increase
revenue for their shareholders, not to reduce the growing number of HIV
related
deaths on every continent.
Through organisations like the Health Institute of New jersey and the
Health
Leadership council, corporations have taken charge of national and
international health policy to the detriment of billions of people
worldwide.
Syringe manufacturers have adopted tactics of deception, asserting that
needlestick injuries and unsafe injecting practices, and the subsequent
risk of
BBV transmission, can be avoided by the use of their product. They have
ignored
the complexity of the issues faced by health care workers in developing
countries and people who inject drugs across the globe.
The introduction of retractable syringes in Australia
has been through the back door. The trial of these devices in
Australian NSPs
has been veiled in secrecy, possibly to prevent the media and the
public from
making the Wooldridge connection. The fact that former health minister
Michael
Wooldridge is set to make a direct financial gain from the opening of
an
Australian market for retractables, is enough to prompt the Australian
Federal
Police to commence an inquiry into his conduct.
Australian companies have mirrored the multi-nationals' marketing
strategy and
have blatantly flouted trade practice laws and guidelines issued by the
Therapeutic Goods Administration for the advertising of medical
devices.
Potential investors are being sucked in to this fraud and stand to lose
significant amounts of money when the bubble bursts.
Despite the lack of support across the board, the Australian Government
has
pushed ahead with this trial of an experimental device on human beings.
The
Trial breaches numerous principles of the Nuremberg Code and should be
stopped
immediately.
Nearly three million people died of HIV related causes in 2003. If the
syringe
manufacturers and their drug-producing allies are allowed to continue
their
reign, this figure will continue to grow until HIV has affected every
family on
the planet. It is time we did something about it.
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